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Measuring attitudes towards Social Europe:  
A multidimensional approach 
 
Abstract 
Although the notion of ‘Social Europe’ can refer to different principles and policy options, most 
research narrows down attitudes towards Social Europe to a unidimensional construct. In this 
study, we instead propose a multi-dimensional approach, and contribute to the literature in 
three ways. First, we elaborate the notion of ‘Social Europe’ conceptually, and distinguish 
between the decision-making level for social policy, European social citizenship, 
harmonization, member-state solidarity and interpersonal solidarity. Second, analysing the 
2014 Belgian National Election Study by means of confirmatory factor analysis we evidence 
that citizens indeed have distinct attitudes towards the policy principles and instruments of 
Social Europe. Although these attitudinal dimensions are interrelated, they cannot be reduced 
to a single Social Europe factor, meaning that citizens differentiate in their attitudes between 
various aspects of Social Europe. In addition, our research indicates that member-state 
solidarity is the primary aspect of Social Europe in public opinion, whereas the feature that 
has received most scholarly attention in empirical research to date – the preferred decision-
making level for social policy – cannot be considered as a key component of attitudes towards 
Social Europe. Third, we investigate whether citizens with different educational levels 
conceptualize Social Europe similarly using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. Results 
indicate that the attitudinal factor structure of Social Europe is largely equivalent among lower 
and higher-educated citizens. 
 
Keywords: Social Europe, European integration, social dimension, public opinion, attitudes 
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1. Introduction 
For a long time, European integration was understood as being a project of open economies 
and closed welfare states, in which economic growth resulting from market liberalization would 
preserve the autonomy of the nationally-bounded welfare states (Castles et al. 2010; Ferrera 
2005; Giubboni 2014). The development of a social dimension was a ‘road not taken’ (Leibfried 
and Pierson 1995; Rhodes and Mény 1998; Scharpf 2002). However, the idea of separate 
tracks soon turned out to be impossible, as the economic and social arenas are intrinsically 
intertwined. As a result, the EU has started to engage more actively in European-level social 
policymaking that affects social welfare in the various member states (Gerrits 2015). 
Furthermore, calls for deepening the social dimension in the EU have been heard in the public 
debate (e.g. Allespach and Machnig 2013; Habermas 2013; Nida-Rümelin et al. 2013). Some 
authors perceive ‘Social Europe’ as an opportunity to strengthen public support for European 
integration (Fernandes and Maslauskaite 2013b; Grozelier et al. 2013; Vandenbroucke 2013). 
The further development of a Social Europe is believed to increase the legitimacy and 
accountability of the European Union, as it would raise the profile of the EU as a provider of 
social protection. However, Eurobarometer data shows that almost half of the European 
citizens believe that the European project has not been beneficial to them and that the EU 
threatens social standards and national welfare (EB 65, EB 81; European Commission 2007, 
2014). 
The issue of Social Europe is controversial given the strong historical link between the national 
state and welfare policies. Although the role of the EU and the scope of its competences in 
social policy are contested (Føllesdal, Giorgi, and Heuberger 2007), citizens’ opinions about 
European social policy have received surprisingly little scholarly attention to date. In this 
contribution, we argue that the measurement of citizens’ attitudes towards Social Europe is 
the Achilles’ heel of existing research. Current studies lack a clear conceptualization of Social 
Europe, including its dimensionality. As a result, the measurement of attitudes towards Social 
4 
 
Europe is unsatisfactory. Most existing studies measure these attitudes by focusing on a single 
dimension (Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 2014; Burgoon 2009; Gerhards and Lengfeld 
2013; Lengfeld, Schmidt, and Häuberer 2015), usually on what citizens consider to be the 
most appropriate level for social policymaking (national versus European) (Mau 2005; 
Beaudonnet 2013). Other studies (Berg 2007; Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer 2014) 
aggregate items that refer to different, conceptually distinct dimensions, such as the principles, 
degree, scope and instruments of EU-level social policy. Scientific knowledge regarding 
attitudes towards Social Europe – as well as the dimensionality of these attitudes and their 
interrelations – is seriously constrained by this lack of clarity regarding conceptualization and 
measurement.  
In this article, we attempt to remedy these shortcomings and to clarify the operationalization 
of citizens’ attitudes towards Social Europe. Concretely, we address the following three 
research questions: (1) Which different dimensions of Social Europe can we distinguish 
conceptually based on the principles, scope and instruments of EU-level social policy? (2) 
How can the attitudes towards these aspects of European social policy be operationalized and 
measured among citizens, and do citizens distinguish effectively between these dimensions, 
or is it instead possible to reduce the dimensions to a single underlying construct? (3) Do 
citizens with different educational levels conceptualize Social Europe in a similar way or not?  
We analyse data from the 2014 Belgian National Election Study, and apply second-order 
confirmatory factor analysis to gain insights into the structure of attitudes towards Social 
Europe. By addressing these questions, we contribute to the conceptual and empirical validity 
of measurement of citizens’ attitudes towards Social Europe, and help to progress empirical 
research in this field. As European integration moves forwards, it is plausible that attitudes 
become more complex and multi-faceted (Beaudonnet and Di Mauro 2012; Boomgaarden et 
al. 2011; Cautrès 2012), and that citizens are not equally positive or negative with regard to 
every aspect of Social Europe. 
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2. Conceptualising the dimensions of Social Europe 
Although the concept of Social Europe is frequently used, different meanings of it can be found 
in literature.1 In general, ‘Social Europe’ refers to EU governance that establishes 
supranational social policies and that affects social rights and policies in the member states. 
Martinsen and Vollaard’s (2014: 680) definition formalizes a two-level perspective on Social 
Europe: 
(1) the protection and extension of social rights by means of positive integration and 
market correcting/restricting policies, and (2) the intervention in national social policies 
to enforce the market and promote free movement, free competition and non-
discrimination. Whereas the imperatives of market correction and non-discrimination 
may establish (European) social rights, market enforcing and non-discrimination tend 
to weaken the spatial boundaries of the welfare state and challenge the traditional 
allocation principles for social sharing. 
This definition highlights the different aspects of Social Europe and describes EU social policy 
integration as resulting from market-making, market-correcting and non-discrimination 
initiatives. In addition, the definition focuses exclusively on EU policymaking, not on member 
states’ social policies, which are included in other approaches (Ferrera 2014; Vandenbroucke 
2014).  
Different constitutive dimensions of Social Europe emerge from the aforementioned literature. 
First, Social Europe includes decision making at the European level on specific social policy 
measures. Second, the concept may also refer to the Europeanization of social rights, linked 
with the free movement of people and the workforce. Third, a wide range of European social 
policies are oriented towards the harmonization of member states’ social policies through 
social regulation and mutual surveillance. Last, Sangiovanni (2013) argues that EU solidarity 
                                                            
1
 For a discussion of the notion of the ‘European Social Union’ see Vandenbroucke (2013, 2014), for the ‘European 
Social Model’ see Alber (2006) and Jepsen and Pascual (2005), and for ‘European social integration’ see Threlfall 
(2007). 
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essentially needs to incorporate the principles of member-state solidarity as well as the 
principles of transnational solidarity defining obligations among EU citizens. As a result, we 
distinguish five dimensions of Social Europe: a supranational decision-making level for social 
policy, European social citizenship rights, harmonization of the social policy of member states, 
solidarity between member states and interpersonal solidarity between European citizens.  
Table 1 summarizes these dimensions, their most important related policy instruments and 
the existing empirical studies on citizens’ attitudes towards these particular principles or 
instruments. Although the overview is not exhaustive, these main policy options represent the 
contours of EU social policy.2 Below, we elaborate the dimensions in greater detail. 
 
2.1 Decision-making level for social policy 
Social Europe implies at least some competences of policy making at the EU level to create 
supranational social policy or to intervene in member states’ policies. Social Europe therefore 
relates to the decision-making level for social policy, referring to the level at which social policy 
should be determined: local, regional, national or supranational. The question of which level 
for decision making is appropriate can be answered on different grounds (De Winter and 
Swyngedouw 1999). Legally, the division of power between the EU and its member states is 
guided by the principle of subsidiarity, which authorizes intervention by the EU when the 
objectives of an action cannot be satisfactorily achieved by the member states (European 
Parliament 2015). Current multilevel governance implies that certain policy issues are dealt 
with by different governments, very often through shared competences (Leibfried 2000; 
Leibfried and Pierson 1995). The question of whether welfare issues should be subject to EU 
decision making is controversial, because it always contains a territorial dimension. In 
                                                            
2
 We do not include the social dialogue or collective bargaining at the EU level in our conceptualization, despite 
the fact that these can also be considered aspects of Social Europe (e.g. Gold 1993). 
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essence, European social integration refers to a process of boundary redrawing, transferring 
social and welfare competences to the European level (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005).
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Table 1: A conceptual framework of the dimensions of Social Europe and an overview of empirical studies 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy principles Description Policy instruments Empirical studies on attitudes 
 
 
Level for decision making regarding social policy 
Ray 2004 
Mau 2005 
Berg 2007 
Eichenberg and Dalton 2007 
Beaudonnet 2012, 2013 
European social 
citizenship 
The granting of social rights to EU 
citizens or a Europeanization of social 
rights 
- Provide EU citizens with access to 
national social protection schemes 
- Portability of social rights to other 
member states 
Berg 2007 
Gerhards and Lengfeld 2013 
Gerhards and Lengfeld 2015 
 
Harmonization  Harmonization of national social 
policies and improvement of national 
social standards 
- Social regulations 
- Mutual surveillance 
Gerhards, Lengfeld and Häuberer 2014 
 
Member-state solidarity Redistribution between member states 
of the EU 
- Structural funds 
- Bailouts  
Beaudonnet 2014 
Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014 
Lengfeld, Schmidt and Häuberer 2015 
Interpersonal solidarity Redistribution between EU citizens  - European unemployment insurance 
scheme 
- European child benefit 
- European minimum income benefit 
/ 
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2.2 European social citizenship 
Granting social rights to EU citizens is a cornerstone of Social Europe, as it is constitutive in 
the development of European social citizenship (Bruzelius, Chase, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2014; 
Faist 2001; Gerhards and Lengfeld 2015; Magnusson and Stråth 2004; Schall 2012). From 
the beginning of the European integration process, EU social policy has been aimed at 
securing the free movement of workers. The 1957 Treaty of Rome granted EU citizens access 
to other member states’ social security schemes and introduced the transferability of already-
earned social security rights between member states. In this sense, social benefits and 
services are no longer restricted to a member states’ own citizens and can be taken up by 
people residing outside of the state’s territory (Bruzelius et al. 2014: 2; Falkner 2010: 301; 
Leibfried 2015). As European social citizenship prohibits welfare discrimination towards non-
nationals, it offers a new perspective on social rights. The granting of social rights by EU 
institutions redefines the boundaries between insiders and outsiders in social sharing systems, 
because the process of European integration introduces a distinct EU citizenship decoupling 
some rights from national territories (Ferrera 2005: 43). 3 
  
2.3 Harmonization: Social regulations and the open method of co-ordination  
A wider range of European social policy measures has been put into practice through the 
harmonization of member states’ social policies (Falkner 2009a; Threlfall 2003). The 
harmonization of national social policies and the convergence of social standards are mainly 
addressed through social regulations. Social regulation refers to the regulatory regime that 
constrains or reinforces member state law making (Majone 1993). The increasing use of 
qualified majority voting instead of unanimous voting has contributed to a growing body of EU 
legislation (Martinsen and Vollaard 2014). There are three main fields of EU social regulation 
                                                            
3
 The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) formally introduced EU citizenship, setting out that any national of a member 
state is legally also a ‘citizen of the Union’. 
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with large amounts of binding and non-binding norms: health and safety at work, other working 
conditions and equality in the workplace and beyond (Falkner 2009b, 2010). In some member 
states, the EU social regulations had considerable legal consequences due to inadequate 
national legislation, while in others no major changes were required. Nevertheless, these 
directives reduce the autonomy of national welfare states in policy design.  
Mutual surveillance among national policymakers, mostly practised through the open method 
of co-ordination (OMC), is a second instrument that facilitates social policy harmonization. In 
contrast to social regulations, the OMC does not take competences away from national 
governments, but has potentially converging effects on national social policies through mutual 
learning and peer pressure (Hodson and Maher 2001; Porte, Pochet, and Room 2001; Scharpf 
2002; Trubek and Trubek 2005; Von Maydell et al. 2006). Originally developed in the field of 
EU employment policy, the OMC has been steadily extended to health, pension reform, equal 
opportunities and social inclusion (Büchs 2007; de la Porte and Pochet 2012; Pochet 2005; 
Von Maydell et al. 2006). 
 
2.4 Member-state solidarity 
In addition to regulation, Social Europe also involves redistribution. An important redistributive 
principle in the EU is member-state solidarity, based on financial transfers among member 
states (Allen 2010; Crum 2011; Dougan and Spaventa 2005; Gerrits 2015; Raspotnik, Jacob, 
and Ventura 2012; Sangiovanni 2013). In particular, the various structural funds focus on 
reducing regional disparities in income, employment, investment and growth (Anderson 1995; 
Falkner 2010; Geyer 2000; Leibfried and Pierson 1995), in order to strengthen economic and 
social cohesion (Mau and Verwiebe 2010).4 In 2014, the structural and investment funds 
accounted for around 39 per cent of the EU’s total budget, implying strong territorial 
                                                            
4
 The agricultural fund of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is also sometimes perceived as an element of the 
EU’s social dimension (Seeleib-Kaiser 2013).  
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redistribution between EU member states (European Commission 2015). The issue of whether 
and to what extent solidarity between EU member states should exist (Seeleib-Kaiser 2013) 
became crucial during the European debt crisis, when bailout operations for some Eurozone 
member states came into practice (Bechtel et al. 2014; Fernandes and Maslauskaite 2013b; 
Fernandes and Rubio 2012; Lengfeld et al. 2015). In reality, these fiscal aids are credits to be 
paid back and are given on the condition that austerity measures are taken. Nevertheless, 
these measures overturned the ‘no bailout clause’ and are considered as instruments of 
international redistribution (Bechtel et al. 2014) or member-state solidarity (Beaudonnet 2014; 
Gerhards and Lengfeld 2015).  
 
2.5 Interpersonal solidarity 
European integration not only connects states, but also citizens. Interpersonal solidarity refers 
to the willingness of citizens to share risks, to redistribute resources and to support each other 
in order to bridge social divisions. In this sense, interpersonal or transnational solidarity 
concerns obligations among EU citizens (Crum 2011; Sangiovanni 2013). Although a 
European welfare state with direct transfers between EU citizens does not exist, the political 
viability of a European social security system based on interpersonal solidarity has been 
debated (Kleinman 2002). In this scenario, national solidarity would be supplemented or even 
replaced by transnational solidarity. Specific policy proposals based on this logic concern a 
European unemployment insurance scheme (Fattibene 2015; Fernandes and Maslauskaite 
2013a), a European child benefit (Levy, Matsaganis, and Sutherland 2013), and a European 
minimum income benefit (European Economic and Social Committee 2013; Pena-Casas and 
Denis 2014). For Eurozone countries, these policies may function as automatic fiscal 
stabilizers to redistribute money to countries that are hit by asymmetric shocks (Andor 2016; 
Atkinson and Marlier 2010; Dullien 2012; Fattibene 2015; Fichtner 2014; Levy et al. 2013). 
Nevertheless, they imply new forms of solidarity reaching beyond the logic of a Transfer Union, 
as they have essentially an interpersonal nature with resources redistributed between 
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individuals rather than regions or countries. At the same time, the actual proposals of 
transnational solidarity do not require the full harmonization – no ‘one size fits all’ – of social 
security systems across Europe. 
 
3. Public attitudes towards Social Europe 
Empirical research on attitudes towards Social Europe is still in its infancy and as previously 
stated, most studies predominantly focus only on a single dimension (see Table 1). A number 
of studies analyse citizens’ preferred decision-making level for social policy, using opinions on 
whether the local authorities, the (sub)national government or the EU should be responsible 
for social welfare (Beaudonnet 2012, 2013; Berg 2007; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Mau 
2005; Ray 2004). 
Other studies focus on a specific policy principle or instrument. First, public attitudes towards 
a European social citizenship are studied by measuring citizens’ support or opposition towards 
the granting of social rights to non-national EU citizens who live or work in another EU country 
(Berg 2007; Gerhards and Lengfeld 2013, 2015). Although opinion towards the granting of 
social rights to non-nationals is often studied in literature on welfare chauvinism (e.g. Mewes 
and Mau 2012; van der Waal et al. 2010), very few studies focus on the Europeanization of 
social rights in particular.  
Second, attitudes towards the harmonization of national social policies have been investigated 
by measuring citizens’ support for a uniform social welfare system and a uniform minimum 
wage across the EU (Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer 2014). However, the implications of 
these policy measures can involve both regulation and redistribution, making it hard to 
categorize this approach exclusively within the harmonization dimension. Furthermore, no 
empirical studies have been conducted on the attitudes towards the EU’s practices of social 
regulations or mutual surveillance (social OMCs) among member states.  
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Some recent studies (Beaudonnet 2014; Bechtel et al. 2014; Lengfeld, Schmidt, and Häuberer 
2015) investigate public opinion concerning both the principle and practice of member-state 
solidarity in the light of the European debt crisis. These studies capture citizens’ attitudes 
towards the idea of bailout payments for over-indebted EU countries, opinions on the 
conditions under which countries should receive financial support and citizens’ motivations to 
support international financial transfers within the EU. Nevertheless, attitudes towards 
member-state solidarity outside the crisis context or attitudes towards the EU’s structural funds 
have not been surveyed to date.  
In sum, empirical studies either focus on only one facet of Social Europe, or too-readily 
aggregate conceptually distinct dimensions into a single index, whereas other dimensions – 
mainly attitudes towards interpersonal solidarity at European level – remain unexplored. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the pattern of relevant explanatory variables differs considerably 
according to the particular dimension studied (see for example Berg 2007; Gerhards, Lengfeld, 
and Häuberer 2014; Gerhards and Lengfeld 2013) does suggest that attitudes towards Social 
Europe cannot be reduced to a single dimension. To answer the question of which distinct 
attitudes towards Social Europe can be distinguished, and how these attitudes are interrelated, 
is only possible by testing the multidimensionality of attitudes in a measurement approach.  
 
4. Data and Methods 
4.1 Data 
We analyse attitudes towards Social Europe using data from the 2014 Belgian National 
Election Study (BNES) organized by the Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research at 
the University of Leuven (ISPO-KU Leuven) (Abts et al. 2015). This post-electoral survey was 
carried out among a register-based probability sample of Belgians entitled to vote in the 2014 
elections. On completion of a computer-assisted personal interview (response rate 47 per 
cent), respondents were asked to fill out a 20‐page drop‐off questionnaire, containing a 
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specific module on Social Europe. Applying the principles of Dillman’s Tailored Design Method 
(Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2014), we were able to convince 74 per cent of the respondents 
to fill out and send back the drop-off questionnaire (N=1403). The realized sample includes 
49.2 per cent men and 40.4 per cent people with tertiary education, and the mean age is 51.7 
years. The elderly and higher educated are somewhat overrepresented compared with the 26 
per cent who did not return the drop-off (mean age 45.2; 28.7 per cent with tertiary education). 
However, given that in this study we analyse relationships between variables rather than levels 
of support, the impact of this overrepresentation can reasonably be assumed to be limited 
(Heggestad et al. 2015). 
  
4.2 Indicators 
The first dimension, the preferred level for decision making regarding social policy is measured 
by means of three items, each referring to a specific policy area: ‘unemployment benefits’, 
‘pensions’ and ‘health care’. Respondents were asked to indicate the level at which they prefer 
decisions to be taken, choosing from the following four response categories: (1) exclusively 
EU, (2) largely EU, (3) largely national and (4) exclusively national. Compared with the 
Eurobarometer, our operationalization includes more clearly defined policy areas, and offers 
more fine-grained answer options with four categories instead of two. To uncover how the 
decision-making level for social policy relates to preferences regarding other policy areas, we 
also include indicators for two additional policy areas in the analyses: economic policy 
(indicators: budget and government spending, taxes and economic policy) and security and 
foreign policy (indicators: organized crime, migration and asylum policy, defence and army).  
Furthermore, the questionnaire contains multi-item measurements for the other four 
dimensions of Social Europe outlined in Table 1. An overview of the exact question wording 
and the frequency distributions for each of the items are provided in Appendix 1 and 2.  
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Opinions about European social citizenship are operationalized by four Likert five-point agree-
disagree items concerning citizens’ attitudes towards the access of EU citizens to social 
benefits and protection in Belgium. One item concerns equal social rights, two items relate to 
prioritizing nationals and one item refers to the conditionality of social protection.  
Attitudes towards harmonization are measured by support for four types of social regulations: 
obligations imposed on employers to protect health and safety at work, maximum weekly 
working hours, minimum terms of paid leave and minimum terms of maternity leave. 
Responses were coded on a five-point scale ranging from ‘a very bad thing’ to ‘a very good 
thing’. Due to its complexity, we decided not to survey attitudes towards mutual surveillance 
through the open method of co-ordination (i.e. a second aspect of harmonization). 
 Attitudes towards member-state solidarity are measured by three items on a five-point scale 
referring to solidarity between the richer and poorer countries of the EU. These items concern 
supporting member states in economic difficulties, the amount of tax money being 
redistributed, and the necessity for solidarity between EU member states. Due to reasons of 
complexity and specificity, we choose not to refer specifically to bailout payments or to 
structural funds, but instead to general views about solidarity between more and less 
prosperous member states.  
Lastly, interpersonal solidarity is measured by means of two separate scales. On the one 
hand, the attitude towards the principle of interpersonal solidarity is measured directly by two 
items: support for EU measures to reduce income disparities and support for a system of 
solidarity among all EU citizens. On the other hand, four other items tap into interpersonal 
solidarity indirectly by measuring support for the implementation of a European social security 
system. One item concerns the realization of an overall European welfare state, whereas the 
other three items refer to shared European protection schemes for specific policy areas: child 
allowances, minimum income benefits and unemployment benefits.  
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4.3 Statistical modelling 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to study the dimensionality of attitudes towards 
Social Europe. Testing competing models, the analysis proceeds in three stages. First, the 
issue of multidimensionality is addressed by specifying a model containing six dimensions, 
while also testing whether a second-order factor – support for Social Europe – can explain the 
interrelations between these dimensions. Second, we assess the validity of ‘preferred 
decision-making level’ as an indicator of attitudes towards Social Europe. Third, the issue of 
measurement invariance (Davidov et al. 2014) across the low and high educated is addressed 
by multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA). All models are estimated using Mplus 
7.3. The presence of missing data is dealt with by using full information maximum likelihood 
estimation (FIML) (Schafer and Graham, 2002).5  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Attitudes towards Social Europe: Unidimensional or multidimensional? 
To investigate whether the postulated multidimensional structure is reflected in citizens’ 
attitudes, we compare CFA models with competing attitude structures. Model 1 represents a 
CFA model in which the 20 selected items of Social Europe load on one factor. Global model 
fit indices (see Table 2) show very clearly that this unidimensional model does not fit the data 
adequately. Model 2 represents a CFA with six latent constructs (each measured by two6 to 
four indicators) that are uncorrelated. Fit indices improve substantially by specifying multiple 
                                                            
5
 The ML estimation procedure assumes that the indicators are continuous and follow a multivariate normal 
distribution. Given that most of our indicators are five-point Likert items, this assumption is not fulfilled. However, 
simulation studies show that the ML estimator is robust against a violation of the normality assumption as long as 
there are at least five answer categories and the data is not overly skewed (DiStefano 2002; Muthén and Kaplan 
1985; West, Finch, and Curran 1995). As a robustness check, we re-estimated the first and second-order factor 
models (Models 1-5) using robust weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimation for categorical data. This yielded 
very similar results, although factor loadings were slightly stronger and model fit was, depending on the fit index 
considered, marginally worse (χ2, RMSEA) or somewhat better (CFI, TLI). In this article, we report the ML estimates 
because this procedure is more straightforward for testing measurement equivalence. The WLSMV results are 
available on request from the first author. 
6
 In the uncorrelated model, factor loadings for the two indicators of ‘interpersonal solidarity’ – Q121_3 and Q121_7 
– were set equal (constrained to 1) for reasons of model identification. 
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dimensions instead of a single factor, but the overall fit of Model 2 remains unacceptable. 
Modification indices suggest an error correlation between two social regulation items, namely 
between support for the EU’s social regulations on paid leave for employees and support for 
maternity leave. The inclusion of the error correlation improves the model fit significantly 
(∆χ2=43.601 for 1 degree of freedom) and is theoretically justified because both items refer to 
similar instruments: regulations concerning leave. Based on these arguments, we include this 
error correlation in Model 2 and all subsequent models. In Model 3, the assumption that the 
dimensions are unrelated is relaxed, and correlations between the six latent constructs are 
included. Judging by all fit indices, Model 3 performs substantially better than the one without 
correlations (Model 2) and yields a satisfactory model fit. This confirms that the postulated 
dimensions of Social Europe constitute separate but interrelated dimensions. 
 
Table 2: Fit indices of CFA models, attitudes towards Social Europe (N=1403) 
Model  Description  χ2 df RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
1 Single-factor model 4698.500 170 0.138 0.118 0.506 0.448 
2 First-order model with six uncorrelated 
factors 
1514.033 170 0.075 0.149 0.853 0.836 
3 First-order model with six correlated factors 407.289 154 0.034 0.035 0.972 0.966 
4 Second-order CFA (Social Europe) 511.951 163 0.039 0.045 0.962 0.956 
 
In the fourth step, we investigate whether the pattern of correlations between the different 
dimensions of Social Europe can be accounted for by means of a single, underlying second-
order factor (Model 4). The second-order factor model has a good model fit, as the RMSEA 
equals 0.039, the SRMR equals 0.045 and both the CFI (0.962) and TLI (0.956) are sufficiently 
close to 1. This implies that the various attitudinal dimensions of Social Europe are, at least to 
some extent, expressions of a more general evaluation continuum.  
 
 
18 
 
Figure 1: Second-order factor model with standardized factor loadings (Model 4; N=1403).  
 
Source: BNES 2014.  
Note: model fit indices of the CFA model: χ2=511.951, df=163, RMSEA=0.039, SRMR=0.045, 
CFI=0.962, TLI=0.956. All parameters are significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
 
In this measurement model (see Figure 1), all loadings of the items on the first-order factors 
have an absolute value larger than 0.40, and mostly above 0.60. This indicates that the items 
are sufficiently valid and are reliable indicators of the concepts they are intended to measure. 
The extent to which the specific dimensions overlap with the general concept of Social Europe 
can be derived from the second-order factor loadings. These loadings vary considerably in 
strength. The highest is observed for member-state solidarity: the loading of 0.920 implies that 
approximately 85 per cent of the variance in opinions on solidarity with other member states 
can be explained by the Social Europe second-order factor. Or from a different perspective, 
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citizens’ general attitudes towards Social Europe largely coincide with their opinions on 
whether the richest member states of the EU should support the less-affluent ones. In citizens’ 
eyes, member-state solidarity seems to be the primary aspect of Social Europe. This is not 
completely unexpected, as the EU’s various structural funds, which redistribute money from 
the more-affluent to the less-affluent member states, are the kernel of existing Social Europe. 
Although not measured directly, we assume that the impact of the European debt crisis and 
the rescue funds for Eurozone countries are important in this respect. The extensive debate 
about the bailouts for over-indebted member states might explain why citizens’ general 
attitudes towards Social Europe rely so closely on their opinion about member-state solidarity. 
 
Three dimensions show somewhat weaker but still considerable second-order factor loadings: 
0.612 for European social citizenship, 0.530 for the principle of interpersonal solidarity, and 
0.636 for the implementation of interpersonal solidarity through a European social security 
system. These dimensions share between 28 and 41 per cent of their variance with the general 
Social Europe factor, implying they are to a certain extent determined by it, however they do 
not overlap completely. Popular support for Social Europe therefore partly hinges on the views 
that all EU citizens should be given the same access to social rights, that more solidarity 
should exist between European citizens regardless of their country of residence, and that a 
common European welfare system should be developed. 
 
 
The lowest second-order factor loading is found for the preferred decision-making level for 
social policy (0.324). This finding delegitimizes the common academic practice of using 
preferred decision-making level as a proxy for attitudes towards Social Europe. Furthermore, 
support for social regulations implemented by the EU is also weakly explained by the Social 
Europe construct (0.371). Citizens responding favourably to these items might express their 
approval for these measures rather than support for the harmonizing role of the EU with regard 
to these social regulations. So neither the preferred decision-making level for social policy nor 
opinions on the harmonization of (implemented) social regulations in the EU substantially 
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shape citizens’ attitudes towards Social Europe. Whereas the first might be too abstract to 
measure support for Social Europe, the latter might be related to support for particular social 
policy measures.  
 
 
5.2 Preferred decision-making level: A valid measurement of attitudes towards Social 
Europe? 
Previous studies on support for European-level social policy have predominantly used the 
preferred decision-making level as a crucial indicator (Beaudonnet 2013; Mau 2005). 
However, our findings indicate that this dimension is only very weakly related to the second-
order factor. Consequently, it seems unjustified to consider the preferred decision-making 
level as a component of citizens’ general attitude towards Social Europe. In order to shed light 
on this essential issue, we add to the factor model six additional items measuring attitudes 
towards the preferred level for decision making regarding two other policy areas. Concretely, 
we specify a model with two second-order factors (see Figure 2): (1) decision-making level, 
which contains the items concerning the preferred decision-making level for social policy 
(three items), for economic policy (three items) and for security and foreign policy (three 
items); and (2) Social Europe, measured by means of the remaining dimensions, thereby 
excluding the preferred decision-making level for social policy. This model tests the hypothesis 
that the preferred decision-making level for the area of social policy does not measure 
attitudes towards Social Europe, but instead indicates a preference for supranational policy-
making in general. The model has an appropriate model fit (RMSEA=0.039; SRMR=0.049; 
CFI=0.948; TLI=0.942) and presents interesting insights. First, the correlation between the 
two second-order factors (Social Europe and decision-making level) is moderately strong 
(0.379). Citizens in favour of supranational policy hold more positive views about Social 
Europe and vice versa. Nevertheless, Social Europe and the preferred decision-making level 
are clearly distinct concepts. The first-order factor loadings of the respective items for 
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economic policy, security and foreign policy, and social policy show an expected pattern with 
most loadings higher than 0.60. As expected, the second-order factor loadings on the Social 
Europe concept are similar to those in the previous model. The second-order factor loadings 
on the decision-making level construct equal 0.873 for social policy, 0.996 for economic policy 
and 0.507 for security and foreign policy. People’s preferences regarding the level for decision 
making therefore correspond almost perfectly with their views on EU involvement in economic 
policies, but also with regard to social policy. The second-order factor loading for the decision-
making level for social policy on the general decision-making construct is substantially 
stronger than the loading we observe on the Social Europe construct (0.324, see Figure 1). In 
this sense, the item on the preferred decision-making level for social policy seems to measure 
support for supranational policy-making rather than attitudes towards Social Europe. In other 
words, the policy-making dimension clearly trumps the social dimension. This finding is highly 
relevant for the assessment of previous research on Social Europe, which is unfortunately 
largely based on this specific indicator (Beaudonnet 2013; Berg 2007; Mau 2005).  
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Figure 2: Second-order CFA model for decision-making level and Social Europe with standardized 
factor loadings (Model 5; N=1403).  
 
Source: BNES 2014.  
Note: model fit indices of the CFA model: χ2=910.535, df=289, RMSEA=0.039, SRMR=0.049, 
CFI=0.948, TLI=0.942. All parameters are significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
 
5.3 Measurement equivalence among high-educated and low-educated people 
In order to draw valid conclusions, the meaning and interpretation of our measurement should 
be equivalent for all subgroups in the population. Because European-level social policy in its 
different aspects is a highly complex and intricate topic, it is possible that these survey 
measurements are too complex for lower-educated citizens. In their study on perceptions of 
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Europe, Gaxie, Hubé and Rowell (2011) argue that survey questions on complex European 
issues are suitable instruments only for respondents with what is termed synoptic involvement, 
that is, those who know the technical and political particularities of European debates and who 
can discuss European issues with ease. To investigate whether our measurement of attitudes 
towards Social Europe may be biased depending on synoptic involvement, we investigate 
whether it is equivalent across higher and lower-educated respondents. In order to test this 
issue, we assume that education level is indicative of respondents’ ability to understand 
European issues and respondents’ familiarity with or interest in these issues (European 
Commission 2010). Our second-order measurement equivalence test (Byrne and Stewart 
2006; Chen, Sousa, and West 2005) allows us to investigate whether citizens with different 
levels of education hold different understandings of the same questions, and whether the 
pattern and means of the various dimensions are comparable across both groups. Concretely, 
we perform a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) of the second-order factor 
model Social Europe (including the first-order factors shown in Figure 2), comparing 
respondents who completed upper-secondary education or lower (N=835) with those who hold 
a tertiary educational degree (N=567). 
Table 3 compares the fit indices of a series of models with different restrictions imposed. We 
start with a configurally-equivalent model (i.e. equal factor structures but no cross-group 
restrictions on loadings or intercepts). The configural model has a good fit (RMSEA=0.04; 
SRMR=0.046; CFI=0.966; TLI=0.959), implying that the number of factors and the pattern of 
factor loadings are similar among the low and the high educated, thus indicating that the same 
dimensional structure is found across both groups. However, this finding does not necessarily 
imply that meaningful comparisons of the latent factor Social Europe can be made between 
the two groups, as this would require scalar equivalence (i.e. equal factor loadings and 
intercepts). Therefore, in the next step we constrain the first-order and second-order factor 
loadings and intercepts (Model 2 in Table 3). Although this model shows a good fit 
(χ2=670.628; RMSEA=0.048; SRMR=0.067; CFI=0.945; TLI=0.942), indicators of local misfit 
24 
 
(modification indices and expected parameter changes) suggest releasing constraints on five 
parameters. These modifications improve model fit considerably (Model 3: ∆χ2=127.679; 
∆RMSEA=0.008; ∆SRMR=0.015; ∆CFI=0.017; ∆TLI=0.017). Table 4 shows the factor 
loadings and intercepts for this final MGCFA model, which implies partial scalar equivalence 
of the first and second-order constructs. Below, we briefly discuss the deviations from full 
scalar equivalence. 
First, the factor loadings for the item regarding whether or not there is too much tax money 
flowing from the prosperous EU countries to the poorer ones (d33_2) is considerably weaker 
for the lower educated (-0.462) than for the higher educated (-0.860). For the higher educated, 
the response to item d33_2 is more consistent with the other indicators of the dimension 
member-state solidarity than for the lower educated. A possible explanation is that the lower 
educated are less aware of the fact that this item has a reverse meaning in comparison with 
the other two items measuring member-state solidarity. Second, the intercept of the item 
regarding minimum paid leave (d30_4) is greater among the lower educated than among the 
higher educated (4.083 versus 3.940). In other words, if we compare lower and higher-
educated people who have the same level of support for social regulations, the former take a 
more favourable stance towards minimum paid leave. Third, the second-order factor loading 
for member-state solidarity is considerably stronger for the lower educated. In fact, for the 
lower educated, member-state solidarity overlaps completely with the second-order factor 
Social Europe.7 Lastly, two second-order intercepts are allowed to differ somewhat between 
the low and the high educated. Controlling for the second-order factor, the higher educated 
indicate slightly less approval for the principle of interpersonal solidarity, whereas they report 
somewhat greater levels of support for a European social citizenship. The MGCFA results 
confirm partial scalar equivalence, giving sufficient grounds for comparing the results of the 
lower and the higher educated in a reliable and valid way. The hypothesis that our 
                                                            
7
 The (standardized) factor loading of member-state solidarity had to be constrained to 1 among the low educated, 
because the loading exceeded the value of 1 for this group. 
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measurement instruments cannot be used for the lower educated is rejected. However, 
although the structure of attitudes towards Social Europe is similar for the low and the high 
educated, our analysis reveals significant differences in the level of support for Social Europe 
between the two groups: among the higher educated, overall levels of support for Social 
Europe are strongest (0.090 for the higher educated versus 0 for the lower educated, see 
Table 4). 
 
Table 3: Fit statistics of MGCFA models for the second-order factor model Social Europe among the 
low and the high educated (N= 1402) 
Model  Description  χ2 df RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
1 Configural invariance 481.267 227 0.040 0.046 0.966 0.959 
2 First-order and second-order factor loadings 
and intercepts invariant 
670.628 258 0.048 0.067 0.945 0.942 
3 First-order and second-order factor loadings 
and intercepts invariant with modifications 
542.949 254 0.040 0.052 0.962 0.959 
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Table 4: Second-order scalar equivalence model among the low and the high educated - unstandardized and standardized (in parentheses) parameter 
estimates (modifications in bold, N=1402). All parameters are significant at the p<0.001 level. 
 Low educated High educated 
First-order Factor loading Intercept Factor loading Intercept 
Member-state solidarity             
D33_1 1 (0.69)     2.82 (3.02) 1 (0.74)     2.82 (3.09) 
D33_2 -0.46 (-0.33)     3.34 (3.74) -0.86 (-0.69)     3.34 (3.99) 
D33_3 0.84 (0.62)     3.38 (3.84) 0.84 (0.71)     3.38 (4.27) 
Interpersonal solidarity             
Q121_3  1 (0.67)    3.54 (3.88)  1 (0.82)    3.54 (3.97) 
Q121_7  0.72 (0.47)    3.40 (3.64)  0.72 (0.57)    3.40 (3.69) 
European social citizenship             
D15_1   1 (0.55)   2.71 (2.52)   1 (0.63)   2.71 (2.67) 
D15_3   -1.17 (-0.66)   3.45 (3.29)   -1.17 (-0.73)   3.45 (3.37) 
D15_4   -0.95 (-0.63)   4.08 (4.55)   -0.95 (-0.64)   4.08 (4.30) 
D15_5   -1.30 (-0.76)   3.99 (3.95)   -1.30 (-0.76)   3.99 (3.65) 
Social regulations             
D30_1    1 (0.59)  4.17 (6.17)    1 (0.67)  4.17 (7.14) 
D30_2    1.51 (0.63)  3.67 (3.83)    1.51 (0.65)  3.67 (4.02) 
D30_4*    1.24 (0.66)  4.08 (5.40)    1.24 (0.68)  3.94 (5.55) 
D30_5*    1.27 (0.53)  3.84 (4.00)    1.27 (0.58)  3.84 (4.48) 
European social security system             
D38     1 (0.61) 2.33 (2.72)     1 (0.69) 2.33 (2.88) 
D39     1.28 (0.79) 2.49 (2.94)     1.28 (0.87) 2.49 (3.03) 
D40     1.29 (0.83) 2.51 (3.09)     1.29 (0.91) 2.51 (3.18) 
D41     1.28 (0.83) 2.42 (3.03)     1.28 (0.89) 2.42 (3.00) 
Second-order Factor loading Intercept Factor loading Intercept 
Member-state solidarity 4.87 (1)     0 (0) 3.30 (0.91)     0 (0) 
Interpersonal solidarity  2.38 (0.52)    0 (0)  2.38 (0.60)    -0.28 (-0.38) 
European social citizenship   2.32 (0.52)   0 (0)   2.32 (0.67)   0.21 (0.33) 
Social regulations    1 (0.33)  0 (0)    1 (0.47)  0 (0) 
European social security system     2.01 (0.51) 0 (0)     2.01 (0.66) 0 (0) 
Mean score Social Europe 0 0.09 
Fit indices χ2=542.949  df=254  RMSEA=0.040  SRMR=0.052  CFI=0.962  TLI=0.959 
 * Covariance between D30_4 and D30_5 allowed. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
The contributions of this study to the conceptualization and measurement of citizens’ attitudes 
regarding Social Europe are threefold. First, we elaborated the notion of ‘Social Europe’ 
conceptually by defining it as a multidimensional concept that refers to various instruments 
and principles of solidarity at European level. Second, our empirical analysis confirms that 
citizens indeed have attitudes to five different, but interrelated, aspects of Social Europe, i.e. 
attitudes concerning European social citizenship, harmonization through social regulations, 
member-state solidarity, interpersonal solidarity and a European social security system. In 
addition, our research indicates that member-state solidarity is clearly the primary aspect of 
Social Europe in public opinion, whereas the feature that has received most scholarly attention 
in empirical research to date – the preferred decision-making level for social policy – cannot 
be considered as a key component of attitudes towards Social Europe. Third, our proposed 
multidimensional measurement of Social Europe proves to be a valid instrument for both high 
and low-educated people, rejecting the proposition that Social Europe is a concept that is too 
complex to be measured among the lower-educated population. 
 
These findings have several repercussions for the interpretation of previous studies as well as 
for future research. Our analyses reveal that the most-often investigated item in previous 
research – the preferred decision-making level for social policy – is measuring support for 
European integration in general, but is not constitutive to citizens’ opinions towards the social 
aspect of European integration. Accordingly, it is misleading to use this indicator to draw 
conclusions about citizens’ attitudes towards Social Europe (Mau 2005) or a European social 
policy (Beaudonnet 2013). Based on our findings, we recommend including at least three of 
the following constitutive components to measure the overall attitude towards Social Europe: 
member-state solidarity, European social citizenship and the European social security system.  
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The validation of our measurement instrument is time and space dependent. Events such as 
the Greek crisis, the refugee crisis and the Brexit referendum – just to mention a few – point 
to the fact that cross-nationally different meanings of Social Europe probably exist. In addition, 
the meaning of Social Europe is likely to be related to the social protection level of the national 
welfare system. For instance, harmonization of social policies might be an important 
component of Social Europe in the minds of citizens living in less-developed welfare states, 
whereas this may be less relevant for citizens in well-developed welfare states, in which EU 
social regulations improve existing social protection to a lesser degree. Furthermore, the 
finding that member-state solidarity functions as a ‘master template’ must be treated with great 
care in a cross-national perspective, because this aspect of Social Europe possibly does not 
equally contribute to citizens’ overall attitude towards Social Europe across member states. In 
net-contributing countries, member-state solidarity might be a sensitive topic that dominates 
the debate on Social Europe in general. In net-receiving countries, the relevance of Social 
Europe’s separate components may be more balanced. In addition, the politicized debate 
about financial aid for debt-ridden member states in recent years may partly explain why 
citizens’ attitudes towards member-state solidarity coincide so strongly with their overall 
attitudes regarding Social Europe – at least in the Belgian case. Nevertheless, further research 
needs to shed light on the cross-national and cross-temporal validity of our instrument.  
 
In addition, future contributions could expand the scope of the attitudes that are included. The 
proposed measurement focuses on the content of Social Europe; on its policy principles and 
to a limited extent on its policy instruments. New measurements might focus additionally on 
Social Europe’s policy instruments, as they are not fully captured in our approach. 
Furthermore, a measurement of Social Europe might also include citizens’ attitudes towards 
the social policy priorities for the European Commission (Burgoon 2009), the performance of 
the European social policy (Beaudonnet and Di Mauro 2012) and its (un)intended 
consequences, in order to shed more light on the multi-layered nature of attitudes towards 
Social Europe. 
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In the near future, studies concerning the measurement of attitudes towards Social Europe 
should certainly be complemented by research on the determinants of citizens’ attitudes 
towards its various dimensions, because a new integration-demarcation conflict (Kriesi et al. 
2008) between winners and losers of globalization might emerge. The opening of national 
welfare boundaries and restructuring at the European level are expected to be supported 
differently among different groups within national communities, as well as between EU 
member states, depending on whether people perceive Social Europe as a threat or an 
opportunity. Lastly, researchers should also investigate the extent to which attitudes towards 
Social Europe go beyond Euroscepticism as such, and whether Europeans’ perceptions of the 
EU’s impact on national welfare states elicit negative or positive attitudes towards further 
European (social) integration.  
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Appendix 1: Support for Social Europe among Belgians (percentages weighted by 
age, gender and education) 
Decision-
making level a 
Can you tell me for each of the following policy domains whether decisions in those domains should, 
according to you, be taken exclusively by the European Union, primarily by the European Union, primarily 
at the national level or exclusively at the national level? 
  Exclusively 
national 
level 
 
Primarily 
national 
level 
Primarily 
EU 
Exclusively 
EU 
 
Q119_2 Health care 35.69 42.83 15.47 6.01  
Q119_7 Pensions 43.29 42.44 10.14 4.13  
Q119_12 Unemployment benefits 40.68 44.60 9.90 4.82  
European 
social 
citizenship 
Now we would like to ask your opinion on whether EU citizens should have access to social security in 
Belgium. By EU citizens we mean people who have come to Belgium from other EU member states and 
live here. Social security provides citizens with an income in case of illness, unemployment and disability. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  Completely 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree  Completely 
agree 
D15_1 EU citizens should receive the same 
social facilities as Belgians 
10.49 27.83 30.32 26.58 4.77 
D15_3 In the allocation of social benefits 
Belgians should have priority over EU 
citizens 
4.10 22.41 25.15 36.31 12.03 
D15_4 EU citizens should first have a job 
before they gain access to social 
services 
1.37 6.91 17.32 45.65 28.75 
D15_5 Let’s support the poor in our country 
first, before we help the poor coming 
from other EU countries 
2.54 10.27 22.23 33.39 31.58 
Social 
regulations 
Below are a number of measures that the European Union has taken in recent years. Can you indicate for 
each of the following measures whether it is a (very) good or a (very) bad thing that the EU has taken 
these measures? 
  A very bad 
thing  
A bad 
thing 
Neither 
good nor 
bad 
A good 
thing  
A very 
good thing 
D30_1 The EU imposes a number of 
obligations on employers to protect the 
health and safety of workers 
0.22 1.33 9.42 58.71 30.32 
D30_2 The EU prohibits a workweek of more 
than 48 hours (including overtime) for 
workers in the EU member states 
1.68 9.39 25.40 43.60 19.93 
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D30_4 The EU posits that workers in the EU 
member states are entitled to paid 
leave for a period of at least 4 weeks 
0.17 2.17 14.68 53.23 29.76 
D30_5 The EU obliges all EU member states 
to provide at least 4 months of paid 
maternity leave to women who gave 
birth 
1.28 5.92 20.67 42.87 29.26 
Member-state 
solidarity 
The following statements are about solidarity between member states of the European Union. To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  Completely 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree  Completely 
agree 
D33_1 Rich EU countries such as Belgium 
should always support other member 
states that experience serious 
economic difficulties 
6.34 28.30 37.62 25.59 2.15 
D33_2 Too much tax money is going from the 
prosperous EU countries to the poorer 
EU countries 
2.49 13.90 43.73 33.11 6.76 
D33_3 The solidarity between the richer and 
poorer EU countries should not be 
broken 
2.06 9.03 37.54 42.83 8.54 
Interpersonal 
solidarity 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  Completely 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree  Completely 
agree 
Q121_3 A system of solidarity between all EU 
citizens needs to be established 
2.50 13.44 23.00 54.43 7.63 
Q121_7  The EU should take measures to 
reduce income differences between all 
EU citizens  
1.50 18.04 27.75 43.98 8.73 
European 
social security 
system a 
 Completely 
against  
Rather 
against 
Rather 
for  
 
Completely 
for 
 
D38 General systemb 14.31 37.36 40.16 8.17  
D39 Child benefitb 11.94 47.25 29.09 11.72  
D40 Minimum income benefit b 10.94 49.06 30.00 10.00  
D41 Unemployment benefit b 9.25 44.51 34.97 11.27  
a
 Answer categories are reversed, b Questioning is given in Appendix 2 
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Appendix 2: Survey questions on a European social security system  
D38 European 
social security 
system 
Currently, each member state of the European Union is responsible for its own system of 
social security. This social security provides citizens a minimum protection in the event of 
illness, old age, unemployment or disability. Some are saying we should stablish a common 
system of social security within the European Union, to which all EU citizens pay 
contributions. Are you for or against such a common system of social security at the EU level? 
Introduction 
D39-D41 
In the social policy domain, the European Union can do many things. In the following four 
questions we describe four different measures the European Union could possibly take. Are 
you for or against these measures? 
D39  
European child 
benefit 
One possible measure is the introduction of a European child benefit. Through this measure 
the EU guarantees a minimum benefit for children in the European Union that is adapted to 
the cost of living in each country. To fund the European child benefit, each country would pay 
according to its wealth. Additionally, member states could opt to further increase the child 
benefit in their own country at their own expense. Are you for or against the introduction of 
such a European minimum child benefit by the EU? 
D40  
European 
minimum 
income benefit 
A second possible measure is the introduction of a European minimum income. Through this 
measure the EU guarantees a minimum income benefit for all poor people in the European 
Union that is adapted to the cost of living in each country. To fund the European minimum 
income, each country would pay according to its wealth. Additionally, member states could 
opt to further increase the minimum income in their own country at their own expense. Are 
you for or against the introduction of such a European minimum income by the EU? 
D41  
European 
unemployment 
benefit 
A third possible measure is the introduction of a European unemployment benefit. Through 
this measure the EU guarantees a minimum unemployment benefit for all temporary 
unemployed in the European Union that is adapted to the cost of living in each country. To 
fund the European unemployment benefit, each country would pay according to its wealth. 
Member states could opt to further increase the benefit in their country at their own expense. 
Are you for or against the introduction of such a European unemployment benefit by the EU? 
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